agreements with various of the Republics, under which it has undertaken to apply these standards to the considerable number of Axis nationals transferred to this country during the war for detention and for eventual repatriation to the extent warranted.

In addition to this active deportation program, the Committee is about to take a similar special action relative to preventing dangerous Axis elements from entering this Hemisphere, especially from neutral countries such as Spain and Portugal, where the problem is particularly pressing. In this connection, the Committee has already approved and is about to issue a formal note addressed to all of the American Republics alerting them to the very real danger that some of the dangerous Nazis still remaining in neutral countries will reach this Hemisphere, particularly because of the termination of the navicert controls, and calling upon them to establish in Spain, and to the extent necessary in other countries, joint methods of informal clearance of applications for entry designed to attain an advance consultative check in all cases of known or suspected dangerousness. This plan will also feature the exchange of lists among the American diplomatic representatives at such points in order to implement the scheme. We expect that this recommendation of the Committee will receive the interest and support of sufficient of the Republics to make it workable.

In connection with the Committee's work along these lines, the Committee has heretofore inquired whether the paper clip project, on which there had been some press report, was inconsistent with its proposed lines of action, which the United States was supporting. Our member, Ambassador Boal, replied that, while he was not too familiar with the matter, he understood that any persons brought to this country under the project would be here in military custody, and otherwise implied that the project was merely a temporary one designed to obtain scientific and other information of military use from these people, which could be done more conveniently here than elsewhere. The Committee accepted this explanation.

There are now, however, indications that this explanation may not really hold water. While our data is sketchy, it appears from what is available that the standards of dangerousness established for the American Republics would require non-admission of many, if not most, of the people to be imported under this project, since, in effect, the standards require exclusion of any person who has had a

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leading position, including technical experts, in any organization or group which served the interests of the Axis. Moreover, there are also indiciations that, in fact, more or less permanent residence and the possibility of acquisition of citizenship, plus more or less complete liberty, will be accorded these people. If these indications have substance, the project will, of course, be in conflict with the Committee's work, the positions this Government has taken in supporting this work, and with the underlying commitments of the United States reflected in Resolution VII at Mexico and Resolution XVII at Rio.

This Government would then naturally be placed in a most embarrassing position vis-a-vis the other American Republics. It would be required to reverse completely the positions, some of them quite firm, which it has taken in support of these hemispheric agreements, and with whatever grace was possible, announce that it could no longer adhere to its agreements. The effect of this, of course, would be to demolish substantially the entire multilateral security structure which these resolutions have helped to create.

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